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Opportunities for the Coregulation of Food 
Safety: Insights from the United Kingdom
By Andrew Fearne and Marian Garcia Martinez
Introduction
The increase in the recorded incidence of foodborne illness
and the recent history of high-profile outbreaks of illness
that have been linked to food have created both political
and economic demands for more effective controls. Con-
sequently, government regulation of food safety has
increased substantially in the last decade, including the
introduction of ex ante direct regulations as well as ex post
indirect controls. Alongside public intervention, private
mechanisms of food safety control have also developed
substantially and now play an important role in the supply
of higher quality, safer food.
In reality, the distinction between public and private
regulations and standards is less discrete than often
assumed; in practice, there is a continuum between the
two (Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998). In most
markets public and private safety regulations coexist, and
there can be considerable interrelationships and dependen-
cies between them. On the one hand, private regulations
and standards can evolve as a mechanism to facilitate com-
pliance with regulatory requirements. On the other, regu-
lations can reference private standards as part of their
requirements. Moreover, the interaction between self-regu-
lation and public regulation could provide a superior out-
come, as industry and firms are often more knowledgeable
regarding product quality, and public regulation can gen-
erate reputation-based incentives to monitor quality, in the
form of public exposure (Nuñez, 2001).
This paper explores opportunities for coregulation of
food safety as an alternative to traditional direct govern-
ment intervention. It aims to contribute to the current
debate on the role that government and industry should
play in providing for an optimal food safety system while
ensuring that all actors in the chain, from producers to
consumers, benefit from the efficiency gains that are possi-
ble when the responsibility for protecting consumers from
foodborne illnesses is shared between the public and pri-
vate sectors.
The potential benefits of coregulation of food safety
are self-evident—coercion breeds minimal compliance,
resulting in suboptimal improvements to public health,
and often comes with a significant bill for enforcement
and monitoring—but coregulation remains a relatively a
new concept in most parts of the world. The lack of trust
among actors in the food chain and the perceived risk
associated with allowing market forces to play a role in the
regulatory process are, in our opinion, key limiting factors
for closer coordination of private and public resources in
the regulation of food safety. However, the view of food
safety responsibilities (and liabilities) from farm to table
brings about a new paradigm in stakeholder relationships
characterized by complex interaction between public and
private modes of regulation (Fearne et al., 2004a). This
shift of responsibilities towards the private sector has cre-
ated a more complex and demanding “policy space”
involving public and private sector incentives and controls
(Garcia Martinez & Poole, 2004), hence the need to
explore the opportunities for greater public-private coordi-
nation in the effective and efficient regulation of food
safety.
I n the U nited Kingdom, food safety r egulation and
standards are articulated through a central coordination
standard-setting system headed by the Food Standards
Agency (FSA) with implementation and enforcement
delivered by its own agents (the Meat Hygiene Service) or
others (Environmental Health Practitioners [EHPs]
employed by the local authorities). Although the majority
of food law is derived from the European Union (EU),
there remains scope for the FSA to propose new direct reg-
ulations or alternative approaches aimed at improving
public health and protecting consumers in policy areas not
regulated by EU law. Moreover, current EU regulatory110 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
developments towards more flexible
risk-based approaches to food safety,
with greater responsibility lying more
explicitly with the private sector, are
opening new opportunities for gov-
ernment and industry to work
together to deliver a socially opti-
mum level of food safety.
Coordinated Approach to Food 
Safety
For any given policy issue, the
options for public intervention range
from doing nothing to direct pre-
scriptive regulation (Better Regula-
tion Task Force, 2003). In between,
there is a wide range of options avail-
able, ranging from information and
education campaigns where people
change their behavior of their own
accord, to incentive-based structures,
private regulation, and coregulation.
Though probably unpopular
among consumer lobby groups, there
may be circumstances where it could
be better for the government not to
intervene. A careful analysis of the
benefits and costs of alternative regu-
latory options could advise policy
makers that no intervention is the
best course of action, in particular
when the costs of preventing a highly
improvable food safety failure out-
weigh the estimated benefits. More-
over, there could be issues of equality
on the incidence of costs and/or ben-
efits placed upon, or derived by, a
particular section of society as a
direct result of public intervention,
which could advise governments not
to exercise their powers. In addition,
the difficulty or impossibility of
enforcing new legislation could also
prevent governments from interven-
ing.
At the other extreme, command-
and-control intervention would be
required when the market fails to
deliver the level of safety necessary to
meet public health requirements.
Within this hierarchy of public inter-
vention, there are a number of possi-
bilities to coordinate public and
private resources in the regulation of
food safety. The question is what
form should this coregulation take,
and under what circumstances might
private regulations and standards be
the most efficient and effective mech-
anisms to manage food safety, either
in combination with or as an alterna-
tive to public intervention?
Coregulation is an approach in
which a mixture of instruments is
brought to bear on a specific prob-
lem, typically involving both primary
legislation and self-regulation or at
least some form of direct participa-
tion of bodies representing stake-
holders in the regulatory process
(Eijlander, 2005). Coregulation aims
to combine the advantages of the pre-
dictability and binding nature of leg-
islation on the one hand and the
more flexible self-regulatory
approach on the other. Coregulation
thus involves self-regulation and reg-
ulation working together, mutually
reinforcing each other.
Hence, an essential aspect of a
cooperative approach to governance
is the cooperation between the public
and private sectors in the process of
creating new rules. This cooperation
in the field of regulation may, how-
ever, result in various forms, such as
agreements, conventions, and even
regular legislation (Eijlander, 2005).
In the last case, this government reg-
ulation is the result of a process of
negotiating between the public and
the private parties involved. How-
ever, the key to the coregulation
debate is the distinction between pri-
vate and public motives for the use of
coregulation and the possible rela-
tionship between private and social
benefits and costs emerging under a
coregulatory framework. In the field
of food safety economics, the public-
interest and private-interest
approaches in the regulation theory
are well documented (Fearne et al.,
2004a). The public food safety poli-
cies focus on the regulation of mar-
kets to increase social welfare
(improvements in public health),
whereas the private-interest approach
is concerned with the study of the
position of interest groups in the pro-
cess of regulation. An element in the
latter approach is the concern that
the relationships between the regula-
tors and the regulated may become
too close and thus lead to capture,
that is, the pursuit of the regulated
businesses’ interests rather than those
of the public at large.
Within this context, the analysis
of coregulation of food safety pre-
sented in this paper will focus on
four stages in the regulatory process
where greater coordination of public
and private efforts may be justified:




Early-Stage Coordination: Impact on 
the Quality of Regulation
In recent years, governments have
turned to the use of risk assessment
methodologies to provide fairly stan-
dardized evaluations of specific risks.
On the risk management side, careful
analysis of the benefits and costs of
alternative regulatory interventions
can play a similar role in disciplining
decision making and providing solid
support for the regulatory options
chosen (Caswell, 1998, 2004). Pre-
cise forecasts of economic benefits
and costs can rarely be made, but sys-
tematic analysis can differentiate
between policy options that are
promising and those that are not.2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2) CHOICES 111
Regulatory impact assessment
(RIA) for all new legislation is a com-
mon feature in developed countries,
including the United Kingdom,
where existing legislation is also sub-
ject to periodic assessment every
three years (post-implementation
reviews). RIAs have the potential
benefit of allowing for comparative
analysis of different policy options,
which may inform the policy deci-
sion-making process. However, the
widespread perception within the
UK food industry is that RIAs are
generally undertaken too late in the
decision-making process to have any
significant influence on the legisla-
tion, and there is inadequate consul-
tation with industry over the scale
and incidence of likely compliance
costs (Fearne et al., 2004b). This is of
particular concern, as previous
research has revealed little evidence
to enable conclusions to be drawn
about the effectiveness of RIAs to
produce better food safety legislation
(Fearne et al., 2004a).
Greater and earlier engagement
of stakeholders would lead to better
regulation by taking account of
industry/sector-specific require-
ments and characteristics while facili-
tating implementation and
enforcement. The possibility of using
the industry as a sounding board is
particularly important in the process
of evaluating compliance costs and
potential impacts on the competitive-
ness of UK food businesses of emerg-
ing legislation at an early stage in the
regulatory decision-making process.
Closer cooperation is particularly rel-
evant when legislation is developed at
EU levels in order to ensure that
emerging regulations can be properly
and simply implemented and
enforced. However, early work on
RIAs before the relevant legislation is
fixed brings its own problems. If the
legislation has not been decided, or
the guidelines to regulators written,
then how can the interpretation of
those guidelines be understood in
terms of its effect on businesses? If
the legislation and its interpretation
cannot be described, how can stake-
holders estimate the cost implica-
tions?
Development of Baseline Standards
Governments can produce and/or
stimulate the generation of codes of
practice (COPs), which industry can
comply with voluntarily. These codes
are a form of information and set
standards of good practice. For exam-
ple, in the UK, a plethora of private
farm assurance schemes (primarily
driven by UK supermarkets seeking
to comply with the due diligence
requirements of the 1990 Food
Safety Act and subsequent public and
private demands for traceability back
to the farm) that incorporate official
COPs have evolved over the past
decade. All schemes require their
members to be aware of and to
implement COPs. Some scheme
assessors have specific questions
aimed at checking that members
understand and are applying them
(Food Standards Agency, 2002).
However, should the industry
move beyond the legal and official
guidance by setting stringent stan-
dards? This debate is at the heart of
the development of farm assurance
schemes in the UK. Baseline schemes
have an implicit inclusive approach
by aiming at majority participation
and an increase in standards across all
producers while avoiding “gold plat-
ing”—increasing standards (and thus
compliance costs) without justifica-
tion from a public health perspective.
In the UK, baseline schemes cover
over 85% of production in the milk,
eggs, chicken, pork, and combinable
crop sector and over 65% for beef
and lamb and horticultural produce
(Food Standards Agency, 2002).
However, the value of schemes that
do little more than repeating the
basic legal position by focusing pri-
marily on greater uptake is question-
able. Yet, if by doing so, the scheme
raises standards across the whole sec-
tor, consumers and the society in
general would benefit. This argu-
ment touches on the issue of the
development (or lack thereof) of
food safety baseline standards among
UK farm assurance schemes aimed at
improving public health compared to
the “success” of proprietary quality-
assurance schemes developed by UK
food retailers.
Two examples in the UK—the
Lion quality scheme and the ZAP
Salmonella Monitoring Pro-
gramme—illustrate how the progres-
sive development of assurance
schemes towards stringent standards
are seen as beneficial in providing
socially optimum levels of food
safety. Between 1981 and 1991, the
number of cases of salmonellosis in
humans in the UK rose by approxi-
mately 170% and remained high
throughout most of the 1990s. In
March 1991, the Advisory Commit-
tee on the Microbiological Safety of
Food (ACMSF) agreed to set up a
working group to consider the extent
to which eggs were responsible for
this problem. Their report, published
in 1993, concluded that much of the
rise in human salmonellosis was due
to  Salmonella enteritidis, mostly
phage type 4 (PT4), which can
invade the reproductive tract of
chickens (ACMSF, 1993). In an
attempt to restore consumer confi-
dence, the British Egg Industry
Council (BEIC) developed in 1993
the Lion Code of Practice to reduce
Salmonella i n  e g g s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e
food chain. It was substantially
amended in 1998 to provide for a
major  Salmonella vaccination pro-112 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
gram. Because of the life cycle of a
laying hen, this means that since the
end of 1999, the Lion scheme con-
siders it has effectively eliminated
Salmonella from Lion eggs. The
scheme sets standards for the produc-
tion of eggs to significantly higher
levels than required by UK and EU
law in areas including food safety,
product quality, labelling, and animal
welfare. All major retailers specify
Lion eggs and display the Lion logo.
It is UK-wide in coverage. It calcu-
lates that it covers over 85% of UK
egg production (i.e., 95% of free
range, organic, and barn egg produc-
tion and 75% of cage egg produc-
tion). Vaccination is reinforced by
extensive cleaning and monitoring.
Hatcheries, pullet rearing, and lay-
ing hen flocks are regularly tested.
Feed is UFAS assured. Strict on-farm
rodent and biosecurity controls are
enforced; other controls ensure that
the “best before” date on the egg and
pack does not exceed 21 days from
the date of packing and that the egg
is kept at a temperature below 20ºC.
The scheme has a detailed passport
system for birds, eggs, and feed. It
requires on-shell date marking to pre-
vent eggs removed from packs from
losing their age mark.
The results of the scheme are
encouraging. Official data shows
there has been a substantial decrease
in human illness caused by Salmo-
nella enteritidis since 1997 (Figure 1).
A study carried out by the FSA in
2003 (Food Standards Agency,
2004c) shows that only one in every
290 boxes of six eggs on retail sale in
2003 had any Salmonella contamina-
tion, compared with one in 100
boxes in a survey carried out in 1995/
96. This equates to an almost three-
fold reduction in the level of Salmo-
nella  contamination since 1995/96.
The FSA recognises that this is likely
to reflect the measures introduced by
the UK egg industry to control Sal-
monella.
The Assured British Pig (ABP)
scheme has moved in similar direc-
tion with the introduction in June
2002 of the Zoonoses Action Plan
(ZAP) Salmonella Monitoring Pro-
gramme. ZAP was introduced fol-
lowing a report published in 2000,
which indicated that a proportion of
pigs arriving at abattoirs carried Sal-
monella and presented a significant
risk of meat contamination. The
ZAP program is voluntary but oper-
ates in all British assured abattoirs
collecting samples from all assured
pigs, which represent 90% of British
pig meat production. Meat samples
are collected from slaughter pigs by
abattoir staff and despatched to the
laboratory once weekly at the abat-
toirs’ expense. Three samples are col-
lected from each batch of farm
assured pigs that arrive at the abat-
toir. Farms with excessive levels of
positive results will usually have their
assured status suspended, and meat
from their pigs would no longer be
eligible for the Quality Standard or
Special Selected Scotch Marks. Pigs
from these holdings could still be
slaughtered as nonassured pigs in
abattoirs that process these animals,
but the number and market share of
these is in sharp decline. The results
to date are impressive (Table 1); the
target is to reduce the level of positive
results by 25% by the end of 2005.
The above examples illustrate
how the progressive development of
Figure 1. Salmonella Enteritidis infections, England and Wales, 1981–2004.
*Provisional data.
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assurance schemes towards stringent
standards are seen as beneficial in
providing socially optimum levels of
food safety. However, this develop-
ment seems to be uneven across UK
farm assurance schemes (Food Stan-
dards Agency, 2002). It has been eas-
ier for schemes to raise standards
more rapidly where industries are
more integrated or where a smaller
number of suppliers or processors
account for a large percentage of the
market, as in the case of eggs, poul-
try, and pigs. In the beef and lamb
sector, conversely, progress has been
hampered due to the complexity and
length of the red meat chain. There is
a tension between the scheme own-
ers’ desire to keep the majority of
producers loyal to the scheme and
their recognition that consumers
expect standards to improve through-
out the chain.
Process Implementation
Following the application of new EU
Food Hygiene Regulations beginning
January 1, 2006, the responsibility
for the production of safe food will
lie more explicitly with the food busi-
ness operator, a requirement that is
contained in current legislation and
is underpinned in General Food Law.
All food business operators will be
required to put in place appropriate
controls that demonstrate they are
managing food safety within their
business. This legislative framework
represents a move from a prescriptive
command-and-control  approach
towards an enforced self-regulatory
approach (Braithwaite, 1982) with
the regulator imposing a requirement
on businesses to determine and
implement their own internal rules
and procedures in order to fulfill the
regulator’s policy objectives. The
more risk-based and flexible proce-
dures are better matched to the needs
of individual businesses and to
enforcement. They will provide bet-
ter opportunities for businesses to
demonstrate that they have effective
risk management systems, and there-
fore their products present lower risk
to consumers.
The three main EU regulations
that make up the package will be
directly applicable and therefore con-
stitute the law in each member state
of the EU. This means that national
legislation is not required (or indeed
allowed) to give effect to the EU reg-
ulations, beyond providing for their
enforcement in the UK. However,
there are a number of areas in the EU
regulations that either require or
allow member states to adopt certain
provisions as appropriate in their
national law, and these regulations
address these aspects too.
The FSA has produced draft
guidance on the requirements of the
food hygiene legislation applying in
the UK. The aim is to help food
businesses to understand what provi-
sions apply to them and to guide
them through the legislation. Where
necessary, the guidance points food
businesses to other guidance and
sources of advice that will help them
to understand how to comply with
the relevant legal requirements.
However, the move from a pre-
scriptive approach towards an
enforced self-regulatory approach
raises a number of concerns regarding
the delivery of a socially optimum
level of food safety. Though by law,
individual food sectors can develop
and implement their own guidance,
is this level of self-regulation accept-
able by all stakeholders, particularly
consumers and other watchdog
groups? To what extent can individ-
ual food sectors involved in develop-
ing this guidance ensure compliance
by their members? Some form of
inspection system will still be neces-
sary.
Enforcement
Effective regulation depends on effec-
tive and consistent enforcement to
ensure compliance. Therefore, it is
important to determine the type of
inspection policies most appropriate
for motivating food businesses to
achieve target levels. Different
inspection regimes influence behav-
ior in different ways. If the aim is to
win the hearts and minds of food
business operators and their employ-
ees to encourage well-embedded and
lasting changes to practices, enforce-
ment officers may concentrate on
promoting good practice through
advice and education rather than
enforcement action. Conversely,  the
speed of action needed may drive the
decision regarding the best approach
in some cases. For example, where
food products on sale are known to
pose an acute and serious health risk,
enforcement officers discovering
them may seek to have the foods vol-
Table 1. Positive results from ZAP salmonella program, July 2003 through June 
2004 (%).
Jul–Sep 2003 Oct–Dec 2003 Jan–Mar 2004 Apr–Jun 2004
Total 25.0 24.8 24.0 20.7
England 28.2 28.1 27.8 24.5
Scotland 14.0 14.3 11.7 10.1
N. Ireland assured 14.1 13.7 11.3 10.2
Total samples reported 31,851 33,095 36,542 34,212
Note. Data from Zoonoses Action Plan Salmonella Programme Annual Report, 2004 (http://www.bpex.org/
technical/zap/zapannualreport04.pdf). Milton Keynes, UK: British Pig Executive.114 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
untarily surrendered by the food
business operators or seize them with
a view to their subsequent destruc-
tion (Food Standards Agency,
2004b).
Good advice is important, partic-
ularly in the case of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) to help
them to comply with existing and
emerging legislation. A recent study
by Yapp and Fairman (2004) on
enforcement approaches for food
safety in SMEs shows that local
authority education activity has sig-
nificant effects upon inspection rat-
ings scores and compliance levels of
SMEs. The survey results show that
62% of proprietors in food SMEs
demonstrated a lack of knowledge
throughout the compliance decision
process and that interventions that
increase specific food safety knowl-
edge within businesses were the most
effective at improving conditions.
Generic written information was fre-
quently misinterpreted and misun-
derstood, thus limiting its
effectiveness in improving food safety
compliance within SMEs. Formal
enforcement was a vital component
of the compliance process. It acted as
a last-resort action for the enforcer
and maintained the general fear of
enforcement presence in SMEs.
As well as good advice and sup-
port, and an effective inspection
regime, the right incentives need to
be in place to encourage compliance
(Hampton, 2004). Regulatory incen-
tives may be positive, resulting in the
voluntary adoption of appropriate
food safety controls, or negative,
either purposive (in the form of pol-
icy-mediated sanctions for noncom-
pliance, such as fines) or
consequential (in the form of declin-
ing market share and exclusion from
the market). In general, incentives to
enhance food safety have been largely
negative, often focused on warnings
backed up by the threat of financial
penalties in the magistrates’ courts,
whereas a more positive approach,
aimed at helping farms and busi-
nesses comply with food safety legis-
lation, has been largely overlooked.
Regulators can use incentives to
encourage compliance. Good perfor-
mance can be rewarded, most obvi-
ously through lighter inspections
when risk profiling has taken place
(see below). The role of reputational
mechanisms as drivers for invest-
ments in food safety, whereby con-
sumers “discipline” firms by
switching to rival firms when quality
is below certain tolerance levels, has
been found as having a positive effect
for instance on hygiene levels in res-
taurants (Jin & Leslie, 2003).
Finally, effective penalties are an
essential last resort in the regulatory
system. They deter businesses from
breaching regulations and provide
assurance to law-abiding businesses
that those who do try to gain com-
petitive advantage by breaking the
law are properly punished (Hamp-
ton, 2004). Moreover, an effective
penalty regime could help to build
consumer confidence in food and
food regulation (Cragg Ross Dawson,
2005).
Monitoring
Compliance with food safety regula-
tions and standards requires ongoing
monitoring and evaluation of busi-
ness performance to ensure contin-
ued conformity. There is increasing
recognition that inspections could be
inefficient (in terms of use of limited
resources), particularly in the case of
low-risk or high-performing busi-
nesses, and that many objectives of
inspection can be achieved through
means other than inspection, particu-
larly through giving advice (Hamp-
ton, 2004). Hence, many regulators
are starting to use risk profiling to try
to concentrate limited resources
where they are of most use. However,
visiting high risk businesses more fre-
quently must not be at the expense of
the quality and consistency of inspec-
tion (Griffith, 2005).
In the United Kingdom, the FSA
determines how regulation should be
enforced through a statutory code of
practice that directs and advises local
authority EHPs. Until very recently,
the food safety code of practice
required all businesses to be
inspected at least every five years.
The new code of practice for local
authorities, issued by the FSA in
October 2004, allows alternative
(non-inspection-based) enforcement
strategies to be used with the lowest-
risk premises (Food Standards
Agency, 2004a). Moreover, following
the application of the new EU Food
Hygiene Regulations beginning Janu-
ary 2006, food business operators
would be required to implement pro-
cedures based on Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
principles. The universal adoption of
HACCP will move the focus of food
safety inspections from prescriptive
rules to an auditing of HACCP pro-
cedures.
There are opportunities for gov-
ernment agencies to rely more on pri-
vate mechanism of food safety
control (i.e., ISO 9000, HACCP) to
assist their enforcement and moni-
toring process in terms of inspection
frequency ratings. The implementa-
tion of the new EU Food Hygiene
Regulations in January 2006 will
offer an opportunity for the FSA to
move away from physical inspections
of food businesses that have good sys-
tems and a demonstrably good record
through formal recognition of the
level of consumer protection that is
delivered through independently
audited industry standards and assur-2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2) CHOICES 115
ance schemes. This level of coopera-
tion between the public and private
sectors would allow local authorities
to concentrate limited resources on
food enforcement in businesses with
high and poorly controlled risk.
However, the opportunity to use
private industry schemes to assist the
enforcement process could, in turn,
bring equity problems that need to
be considered. For instance, farm
assurance schemes are voluntary, and
thereby nonmembership should not
be considered by the FSA as a failure
by businesses to comply with legisla-
tion (the scope and level of private
and public standards could differ sig-
nificantly). There is a danger that the
issue of “voluntariness,” which is at
the heart of private standards, could
be undermined by government inter-
ference.
Moreover, the role of the enforcer
would change as inspections of good
performers could eventually become
a “checking a box” exercise. However,
this would mean little if the quality
and time for inspections are inade-
quate and if the process is target-
driven rather than outcome-driven
(Griffith, 2005). Achieving consis-
tency and ensuring minimum stan-
dards of food safety, at a time when
inspections move towards a more
audit-based approach with possibly
less-trained EHPs, may become more
difficult. This would eventually raise
concerns as to the ability of the sys-
tem to be a strong deterrent for free
riders and the kind of private stan-
dards the FSA should recognize.
Conclusions
The potential benefits of coregula-
tion of food safety are self-evident—
coercion breeds minimal compliance,
resulting in suboptimal improve-
ments to public health, and invari-
ably comes with a significant heavy
monitoring cost. Coordination of
activities, public and private, at dif-
ferent stages in the regulatory process
(from standard setting to enforce-
ment and monitoring) should result
in safer food at lower (regulatory)
cost as a result of a more effective
allocation of scarce resources. The
fact that we see relatively little coreg-
ulation in practice is, we believe, a
reflection of the lack of trust in the
food chain and the perceived risk
associated with allowing market
forces to play a role in the regulatory
process.
However, change is afoot in the
UK and throughout the EU, where
the principles of coregulation are
being embraced as a mechanism for
moving faster, with greater effect,
and/or at lower cost in certain cir-
cumstances, where risk assessment
and industry structure provide the
right prognosis.
It is perhaps a little early to claim
there are lessons to be learned for the
United States from these recent
developments in the UK, but the
implications of a more widespread
adoption of coregulatory principles
and practices for countries outside of
the EU are significant, not least from
the perspective of international trade.
Food safety is widely regarded as a
regulatory burden that inhibits the
ability of commercial stakeholders
(particularly the smaller ones) to
compete, yet the clamor for more
regulation increases with every new
food scare. Coregulation provides a
mechanism for moving quicker, in a
more targeted (risk-based) way, at
lower cost to both the taxpayer and
private enterprise. Yet the tension
between public and private incen-
tives, the lack of trust, and the chal-
lenge of imperfect information
represent significant hurdles to be
overcome. Thus, any insights that
trigger discussion of how this
approach might develop in other
countries and how these tensions
might be reduced should be encour-
aged, however different the institu-
tional and political approach to
regulation might be.
The work in which we are cur-
rently engaged aims to identify which
combination of public and private
regulation is appropriate for different
regulatory objectives at different
stages in the regulatory process. The
challenge now is to find case studies
of best practice, which we will be
doing in conjunction with our
research partners in the United
States, Canada, and Australia. The
hope is that these case studies will
give pointers to the incentive struc-
tures and regulatory contexts in
which coregulation is most likely to
succeed. It will then rest with the
government agencies and industry
organizations to decide what, if any-
thing, needs to be changed to the reg-
ulatory processes and incentive
structures to facilitate the more wide-
spread consideration of coregulation
as a more efficient and effective way
of improving the safety of our food
supplies.
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